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This paper looks into the interrelation between economic growth, inequality, and 
poverty. Using the notion of pro-poor growth, we examine the extent to which the poor 
benefit from economic growth. First, various approaches to defining and measuring pro-
poor growth are scrutinised using a variety of criteria. It is argued that the satisfaction of 
a monotonicity axiom is a key criterion for measuring pro-poor growth. The 
monotonicity axiom sets out a condition that the proportional reduction in poverty is a 
monotonically increasing function of the pro-poor growth measure. The paper proposes a 
pro-poor growth measure that satisfies the monotonicity criterion. This measure is called 
a ‘poverty equivalent growth rate’, which takes into account both the magnitude of 
growth and how the benefits of growth are distributed to the poor and the non-poor. As 
the new measure satisfies the criterion of monotonicity, it is indicative that to achieve 
rapid poverty reduction, the poverty equivalent growth rate—rather than the actual 
growth rate—ought to be maximised. The methodology developed in the paper is then 
applied to three Asian countries, namely, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The most important goal for the developmental effort has become poverty 
reduction, which can be achieved by economic growth and/or by the distribution of 
income. Issues related to the benefits of growth accrued to the poor have also been a 
priority of development policy in the 1990s. An emerging consensus is that growth 
alone is a rather blunt tool for poverty reduction. In addition to the emphasis on 
poverty reduction, policies of redistribution of income and assets have become 
increasingly important. A policy agenda that addresses both distributional concerns 
and poverty reduction could lead to the enhancement of both economic growth and 
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equity. Indeed, the relation among growth, inequality and poverty is complex and 
interdependent one.  
A view widely held in the domain of development economics is that the 
benefits of economic growth diffuse automatically across all segments of society. 
This is indeed the well-known trickle down hypothesis, which was a dominant 
thinking in the 50s and 60s. In a similar manner, the result derived from a number of 
recent studies suggests that economic growth overall reduces poverty. Among these 
studies, Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) paper has attracted much attention.
1  
This study, based on cross-country regressions, has been criticised for depicting only 
an average picture of the relation between growth and poverty. When large 
differences across countries are averaged out, the results are potentially deceptive 
because country-specific experiences can differ widely. Under the surface of 
aggregate outcomes there are often individual countries that experience an increase 
in poverty during spells of positive economic growth, at least in the short run. 
The relation between growth and inequality has also been debated 
extensively. In his well-known 1955 article, Simon Kuznets found an inverted-U 
pattern between per capita income and inequality based on a cross-section of 
countries: as per capita income rises, inequality first worsens and then improves. 
The major driving force was presumed to be structural change that occurred 
because of labour shifts from a poor and less productive traditional sector to a 
more productive and differentiated modern sector. The hypothesis was supported 
by a number of studies—including Kravis (1960); Oshima (1962); Adelman and 
Morris (1971); Paukert (1973); Ahluwalia (1974, 1976); Robinson (1976) and Ram 
(1988). Yet, with better quality data sets and testing on individual countries, 
Kuznets’ inverted-U has been challenged and seems to have evaporated [Anand 
and Kanbur (1984); Fields (1989); Oshima (1994); Deininger and Squire (1996)]. 
For instance, Deininger and Squire (1996) attempted a comprehensive test of the 
hypothesis and confirmed that there was no evidence of an inverted-U curve for 
individual countries.  
Overall, the relation between growth and poverty is a complex one, and is also 
determined by the level and changes in inequality. Pro-poor growth is concerned 
with the interrelation between these three elements: growth, poverty, and inequality. 
While there remains no consensus on how to define or measure pro-poor growth, the 
issue has attracted a fair amount of attention within academia as well as among 
development practitioners. The pro-poor growth debate has its roots in the pro-
distribution arguments by Chenery and Ahluwalia in the 1970s. Chenery and 
Ahluwalia’s (1974) model of ‘redistribution with growth’ could be regarded as the 
inception of the whole debate on pro-poor growth, as well as a culmination of the 
critique of the trickle-down hypothesis. More recently, pro-poor growth was also 
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(2000); World Bank (2000) and Bruno, et al. (1998).  Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  419
implicit in the term ‘broad-based growth’ used in the 1990 World Development 
Report. While the concept was never defined at that time, it subsequently shifted to 
become referred to as pro-poor growth during the course of the 1990s. 
This paper proposes a measure of pro-poor growth derived from the idea of 
‘poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR)’, which takes into account not only the 
magnitude of growth, but also how much benefit the poor receive from the growth. It 
will be shown that proportional reduction in poverty is a monotonically increasing 
function of the PEGR; the larger the PEGR, the greater the proportional reduction in 
poverty will be. Thus, maximising the PEGR implies a maximum reduction in 
poverty. This paper derives the PEGR for an entire class of additively decomposable 
poverty measures—including the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) and Watts (1968) 
measures.  
Including Section 1 (Introduction), this paper is organised in nine sections. 
Section 2 provides a practical review of various approaches for defining and measuring 
pro-poor growth. It discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of different 
approaches to defining and measuring pro-poor growth. Section 3 describes additively 
decomposable poverty measures, whilst Section 4 is devoted to the formal derivation 
of the poverty equivalent growth rate. Section 5 provides analytical discussions on why 
poverty reduction varies across countries. Section 6 explains how to compute the new 
pro-poor growth measure. While Section 7 outlines the data sources as well as the 
concepts used in the paper, Section 8 illustrates empirical results on Korea, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. Section 9 contains some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  PRO-POOR GROWTH CLASSIFICATION 
Pro-poor growth may be referred as growth that benefits the poor and 
provides them with opportunities to improve their economic situation, as often cited 
by international agencies [UN (2000) and OECD (2001)]. This definition is vague 
and provides little guidance to its measurement or to its policy implications. While 
there remains no consensus as to the definition of this concept and its measurement, 
the issue has received a fair amount of attention within academia and among 
development practitioners. Lately, a number of studies have attempted to define and 
measure a pro-poor growth. These studies include Kakwani and Pernia (2000); 
McCulloch, et al. (2000); Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Son (2003).
2 Each of these 
studies has its own merits and limitations. 
These four measures can be compared in view of whether they: (i) use a weak 
or a strong definition of pro-poor growth, and (ii) use a relative or absolute approach 
under the strict approach; (iii) require a specific poverty line and poverty measure 
(partial vs. full approach); and (iv) satisfy an axiom called ‘monotonicity’. 
 
2In relation to defining and measuring pro-poor growth, there are also studies proposed by 
White and Anderson (2001); Hanmer and Booth (2001); Klasen (2003) and Duclos and Wodon 
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Weak vs. Strong Definitions     
The World Bank’s definition of pro-poor growth is rather weak. It defines 
growth as pro-poor if it reduces poverty (howsoever small) [Ravallion (2004)].  Under 
this definition, the poor may receive only a small fraction of total benefits of growth, 
still the growth process will be called pro-poor. In this paper, we characterise this 
situation as trickle-down when the poor receive proportionally less benefits from 
growth than the non-poor. Literally the word “pro-poor” means that the poor should 
receive more but not less benefits than the non-poor. The World Bank’s definition is 
rather too weak and will classify most growth processes as pro-poor.
3    
The other broad definition of pro-poor growth is stranger and emphasises 
inequality reduction that occurs with poverty reduction during economic growth. 
Studies—including McCulloch and Baulch (2000); Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and 
Son (2003)—all suggest a measure of pro-poor growth that takes into account both 
reduction in poverty as well as improvement in inequality.  
The stronger definition used in this paper is further categorised in terms of 
relative or absolute pro-poor growth. The relative concept arises when economic 
growth benefits the poor proportionally more than the non-poor. The implication is 
that while growth reduces poverty, it also improves relative inequality. This 
definition may be referred to as a relative approach, as it implies a reduction in 
relative inequality. Conversely, a measure of pro-poor growth is absolute if the poor 
receive the absolute benefits of growth equal to, or more than, the absolute benefits 
received by the non-poor. Under this definition, absolute inequality would fall during 
the course of economic growth. In fact, this is the strongest requirement for 
achieving pro-poor growth, and may thus be referred to as ‘super pro-poor’.        
When growth is negative, poverty in general increases. However, there may 
be a situation where a negative growth results in poverty reduction. This situation 
can take place only if the effect of inequality reduction on poverty outweighs the 
adverse impact of negative growth on poverty. This growth scenario may be termed 
as ‘strongly pro-poor’. Another classification of a growth scenario occurs when 
negative growth raises poverty. This may be termed as ‘anti-poor’ even if inequality 
improves during the course of growth. Taking a step further from anti-poor, a 
situation may be called ‘strongly anti-poor’ if both poverty and inequality become 
worse during the spells of negative growth.   
 
Partial or Full Approach 
The Partial approach classifies under what conditions growth can be said to 
be pro-poor or anti-poor without specifying a poverty line and a poverty measure. 
 
3If we extend the World Bank’s definition of pro-poor growth to pro-poor policies, then any 
policy that reduces poverty (however small) will be identified as pro-poor policy, which means that a 
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A measure suggested by Ravallion and Chen (2003) falls into this 
classification in the sense that pro-poor growth is partly defined based on first-order 
dominance condition. Similarly, a pro-poor growth measure proposed by Son 
(2003a) can be also categorised as partial because a growth process is primarily 
determined to be pro-poor (or not pro-poor) by stochastic dominance curves. The 
greatest advantage of using this partial approach is that it is valid for all poverty lines 
and poverty measures. On the other hand, one limitation of this approach is that if the 
dominance conditions are not met, then one cannot infer whether a growth process is 
pro-poor or not pro-poor. On this ground, the approach derived from the dominance 
conditions may be referred to as ‘partial’. Under this partial approach, there are 
certain circumstances where it is impossible to draw conclusive results on the pattern 
of growth. Another limitation of the partial approach is that it does not provide an 
answer as to the degree of pro-poor growth. In other words, the partial approach does 
not tell us by how much one growth process is more pro-poor than another growth 
process. 
The full approach, on the other hand, is always able to provide us with a 
conclusive result as to whether or not growth is pro-poor. Studies—including 
McCulloch and Baulch (2000); Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and Ravallion and Chen 
(2003)—are based on the full approach.
4  This approach gives the complete rankings 
of growth processes because unlike the partial approach, a growth process under the 
full approach is judged from a rate or an index of pro-poor growth, not from a curve. 
To implement this full approach, though, a poverty line as well as a poverty measure 
need to be specified. This demands an inevitable value judgment in choosing the 
poverty line and poverty measures. The PEGR suggested in this paper can be 
regarded as the full approach.  
 
Montonicity Criterion 
The  monotonicity axiom implies that the magnitude of poverty reduction 
should be a monotonically increasing function of the pro-poor growth rate. As 
poverty reduction depends on both growth and the distribution of its benefits among 
the poor and the non-poor, growth alone is a necessary—but not sufficient-condition 
for poverty reduction.
5 This suggests that there is no monotonic relation between 
growth and poverty reduction. This calls for a measure of pro-poor growth that 
captures a direct linkage (or monotonic relation) with poverty reduction, indicating 
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that poverty reduction takes into account not only growth but also how benefits of 
growth are shared by individuals in society. On this account, a pro-poor growth 
measure that satisfies the monotonicity axiom provides a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the reduction of poverty.  
McCulloch and Baulch (2000) propose a measure of pro-poor growth known 
as the poverty bias of growth (PBG). The PBG is derived from the negative of the 
inequality component obtained from the symmetric poverty decomposition 
methodology, which was suggested by Kakwani (2000).
6 The PBG does not always 
satisfy the monotonicity criterion. Higher values of the PBG may not imply a greater 
reduction in poverty because poverty also depends on the growth effect.
7 Thus, the 
PBG will only satisfy the monotonicity criterion if it is assumed that the growth 
effect is constant (which is highly unlikely). 
Ravallion and Chen’s pro-poor growth measure also violates the monotonicity 
axiom. This occurs because they estimate their pro-poor growth measure using 
numerical integration up to the headcount ratio in the initial period (See Appendix). 
Their measure does not utilise the poverty rate in the terminal period.
8 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) proposed an index to measure the degree of pro-
poor index. This index is known as the pro-poor growth index (PPGI), and it is 
derived from the relation between total poverty reduction and poverty reduction in 
the case of distribution-neutral growth. In fact, this relation is expressed as the ratio 
of poverty elasticities, which will be greater than one when a growth scenario is pro-
poor. The values of PPGI are defined separately for the trickle-down and 
immiserising growth scenarios.
9 Like the PBG, the PPGI is merely an index that does 
not address the monotonicity axiom. 
While the PPGI captures the distribution of growth benefits among the poor 
and non-poor, it does not take into account the level of the actual growth rate. In 
response to this, we propose in this paper another pro-poor growth measure called a 
‘poverty equivalent growth rate’ (PEGR) which takes into account the limitation 
 
6To evaluate whether growth is pro-poor (or anti-poor), the PBG measures the extent to which the 
observed pattern of growth deviates from a distributionally neutral benchmark. McCulloch and Baulch 
capture the measure of pro-poor growth by comparing the actual distribution of income with the one that 
would have occurred under the distribution-neutral scenario. In this respect, their measure reflects a 
relative approach to defining pro-poor growth.   
7The growth effect measures the change in poverty due to a change in mean income when the 
distribution of income does not change.  
8See Appendix, which shows that Ravallion and Chen’s pro-poor growth measure violates 
monotonicity using a numerical example. Similarly, Klasen (2003) has pointed out that as Ravallion and 
Chen’s measure deals with the growth rates of quantiles of the income distribution, individuals in the 
initial period may be excluded from the terminal period or vice versa in the process of calculating the pro-
poor growth rate suggested by Ravallion and Chen. 
9PPGI lies between zero and one in the case of trickle-down, whereas the index is negative for 
immiserising growth scenarios. Immiserising growth refers to as a situation where a positive growth 
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underlying the PPGI measure. Moreover, the PEGR satisfies the monotonicity 
criterion. Its formal derivation is shown in Section 4. 
 
3.  ADDITIVELY DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES 
Poverty can be conceptualised in terms of absolute deprivation suffered by the 
population. A person suffers from absolute deprivation if he or she cannot enjoy the 
society’s minimum standard of living to which everyone should be entitled. Suppose 
income x of an individual is a random variable with distribution function given by 
F(x).
10 Let z denote the poverty line, which measures the society’s minimum 
standard of living. A person suffers absolute deprivation if his or her income is less 
than z. If his or her income is greater than or equal to z, we say that he or she does 
not suffer any deprivation. H = F(z) is the proportion of individuals who suffer 
absolute deprivation because their income is below the society’s minimum standard 
of living. H, thus, measures the incidence of poverty in the society and is called the 
headcount ratio. 
The headcount ratio is a crude measure of poverty. It assumes that everyone 
whose income is below the poverty line suffers the same degree of deprivation.   
So it does not take account of the intensity of deprivation that is suffered by the poor. 
To take account of this intensity, we define the degree of absolute deprivation 
suffered by an individual with income x as  
Dep(x) =  P(z,x)     if x<z 
            =  0            if x≥z  … … … … …  (1) 
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which means that the deprivation decreases strictly monotonically with income at an 
increasing rate. The degree of poverty in the society may be measured by the average 
deprivation that is suffered by the society, which is given by 
() ∫ = θ
z dx x f x z P 0 ) ( ,          ...  …  …  …  …  (2) 
where f(x) is the probability density function of x. This is a general class of additive 
poverty measures.  
 
10Instead of income, one can use consumption to measure poverty. Consumption is more widely 
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Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) proposed a class of poverty measures 
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in (2), where α  is the parameter of inequality aversion.
11  
A large number of the poverty measures that exist in the poverty literature can 
be shown to be particular members of the general class of additive poverty measures 
in (2). Among them, Watts’ (1968) poverty measure, which is directly related to 
Theil’s (1967) inequality measure, has all the desirable properties of a poverty 
measure. This measure is given by:  
∫ − =
z dx x f x Ln z Ln W 0 ) ( )) ( ) ( (  ... ... ... ...  (4) 
which takes into account the severity of deprivation suffered by the poor. 
 
4.  POVERTY EQUIVALENT GROWTH RATE 
How does economic growth affect poverty reduction? To answer this 
question, we need to measure the factors that contribute to poverty reduction. 
Poverty reduction largely depends on two factors. The first factor is the magnitude of 
the economic growth rate: the larger the growth rate, the greater the reduction of 
poverty. Growth is generally accompanied by changes in inequality; an increase in 
inequality reduces the impact of growth on poverty reduction. To measure these two 
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which follows from the assumption that P(z, z) = 0: if an individual’s income is equal 
to the poverty line, then he or she does not suffer any deprivation.   
Suppose x(p) is the income level of population at the pth percentile. Equation 











) ( ) (
1
) (   … … … …  (6) 
where g(p)=dLn(x(p)) is the growth rate of income of people on the pth percentile. 
Suppose L(p) is the Lorenz function, which measures the share of total income 
enjoyed by the bottom p proportion of population when the individuals in the 
 
11When α=0, 1, 2, the poverty measure is the headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, and the severity 
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population are arranged in ascending order of their income. Following Kakwani 
(1980), we can write 
x(p) =  µ  L′ (p)  … … … … … …  (7) 
where µ is the mean income of the society and L' (p) is the first derivative of the 
Lorenz function. Taking logarithm of (7) and differentiating it, we obtain 
dLn(x(p))= dLn(µ) + dLn(L' (p)) 
which immediately gives 
g(p)= γ  + dLn(L' (p)) … … … … …  (8) 
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where 










  … … … … … (10) 
is the growth elasticity of poverty derived by Kakwani (1993), which is the 
percentage change in poverty when there is a 1 percent growth in the mean income 
of the society, provided the growth process does not change inequality (when 
everyone in the society receives the same proportional benefits of growth). This 
elasticity is always negative. 
Diving (9) by γ gives  
ζ + η = δ   … … … … … … … (11) 
where  
γ θ = δ / ) ( dLn  
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measures the inequality effect of poverty reduction. This tells us how poverty 
changes due to changes in inequality that is accompanied during the growth process. 
The growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if the change in inequality that accompanies Kakwani and Son  426
growth reduces (increases) the total poverty.
12  Thus, the growth is pro-poor (anti-
poor) if the total elasticity of poverty is greater (less) than the growth elasticity of 
poverty. 
We may now introduce the idea of poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR). It 
is the growth rate γ* that will result in the same level of poverty reduction as the 
present growth rate γ* if the growth process had not been accompanied by any 
change in inequality (when everyone in the society had received the same 
proportional benefits of growth). The actual proportional rate of poverty reduction is 
given by δγ, where δ is the total poverty elasticity. If the growth were distribution 
neutral (when inequality had not changed), then the growth rate γ* would achieve a 
proportional reduction in poverty equal to ηγ*, which should be equal to δγ. Thus, 
the PEGR denoted by γ* will be given by 
γ* = (δ/η)γ = φγ  ... ... ... ... ... ... (13) 
where φ = δ/η is the pro-poor index, which was developed by Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000). This equation implies that growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if γ* is greater (less) 
than γ*. If γ* lies between 0 and γ, the growth is accompanied by an increasing inequality 
but poverty still reduces. This situation may be characterised as a trickle-down process 
when the poor receive proportionally less benefit from growth than the non-poor. 
Taking a step further, growth may be defined as ‘super pro-poor’ if γ* > γ 
(η*/η), where η* is the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth when the benefits 









* .  
In this case, pro-poor growth is defined as absolute, which would occur when 
the poor receive the absolute benefits of growth equal to or more than the absolute 
benefits received by the non-poor. Under this approach, absolute inequality would 
fall during the course of growth. Thus, this absolute approach sets out the strongest 
requirement for achieving pro-poor growth.  
However, it is also possible that a positive economic growth can increase 
poverty, in which case γ* is negative. This can happen when inequality increases so 
much that the beneficial impact of growth is more than offset by the adverse impact 
of rising inequality. Bhagwati (1988) calls this “immiserising” growth. He gives a 
scenario where the more affluent farmers adopt new seeds and raise grain 
 
12Many studies measure the ‘pro-poorness’ of growth by the changes in the Gini index.   
The Gini index is not an appropriate measure of inequality to measure pro-poor growth, because there 
exists no monotonic relationship between changes in the Gini index and the poverty reduction. With mean 
income remaining the same, an increase or decrease in the Gini index can still leave poverty unchanged  or 
an increase (decrease) in the Gini index can lead to a reduction (increase) in poverty. Thus, a change in the 
Gini index can not always tell whether or not growth is pro-poor. ζ defined in (12) has a direct relation to 
changes in poverty. It is based on that part of the Lorenz curve which directly affects the poor. Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  427
production, resulting in lower prices. By contrast, the marginal farmers who cannot 
adopt the new technology find their stagnant output yielding even less income. Thus, 
the green revolution may immiserise the poor. This situation may be rare, however, 
because in the long run the marginal farmers may also catch up with the new 
techniques. The more common situation is where the poor farmers also benefit from 
economic growth but to a much smaller extent than the better-off ones. 
During the recession period, when γ < 0, poverty generally increases but if 
inequality reduces so much that poverty decreases, in which case γ* < 0, then we call 
recession as strongly pro-poor. The recession will be pro-poor if γ < γ* < 0, in which 
case, poverty increases but the poor are hurt proportionally less than the non-poor. 
The recession will be anti-poor if γ* < γ < 0, in which case poverty increases and 
also the poor are hurt proportionally more than the non-poor. 
The proposed PEGR controls how equitable growth rate is. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that the proportional reduction in poverty is an increasing function of γ*: 
the larger γ* is, the greater will be the proportional reduction in poverty. Thus, 
maximising γ* will be equivalent to maximising the total proportional reduction in 
poverty. This suggests that a country’s performance should be judged on the basis of 
the poverty equivalent growth rate and not by growth rate alone. 
To make our message clearer, suppose a country’s total poverty elasticity is 
2/3 of the growth elasticity of poverty. Then from (13), we note that the country’s 
actual growth rate of 9 per cent is equal to the poverty equivalent growth rate of only 
6 percent. Thus, the effective growth rate for poverty reduction is 3 percent lower 
than the actual growth rate because the country is not following pro-poor policies. 
On the other hand, if the total poverty elasticity is supposedly 20 percent higher than 
the growth elasticity of poverty, then the country’s actual growth rate of 9 percent 
will be equal to the poverty equivalent growth rate of 10.8 percent. This indicates 
that the growth is pro-poor because the effective growth rate for poverty reduction is 
1.8 percent higher than the actual growth rate.  
In view of (6) and (10), (13) can be written as  



















  … … … … … (14) 
which shows that the PEGR is the weighted average of the growth rates of income at 
each percentile point, with the weight depending on the poverty measure used. So γ* 
can be computed for any poverty measure. For Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke’s class 
of poverty measures, it is given by Kakwani and Son  428
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for  1 ≥ α . When  1 = α , we get PEGR for the poverty gap ratio as 
*
1 γ  = 
dp p x










which shows that the growth rate of each poor individual receives the weight that is 
proportional to the person’s income. This suggests that 
*
1 γ  is completely insensitive 
to the distribution of income among the poor. 
The PEGR for the Watts poverty measure is obtained by substituting 
P(z,x)=Ln(z)-Ln(x) in (14) as 
*






  … … … … … (16) 
which in fact is the pro-poor growth index proposed by Ravallion and Chen. They 
derived their index by a different methodology, which is consistent only with the 
Watts poverty measure. We have provided a general methodology encompassing all 
the additive separable poverty measures. 
 
5.  HOW TO CALCULATE THE POVERTY EQUIVALENT  
GROWTH RATE? 
The previous section presented the ex-ante analysis of changes in poverty.  
We analysed the change in poverty for many alternative scenarios. In that analysis, it 
was necessary to assume that the change in inequality takes place only by a constant 
proportional shift in the Lorenz curve at all points. As pointed out, the Lorenz curve 
can change in an infinite number of ways and thus the ex-ante analysis of change in 
poverty is not possible under this general situation. However, we can make an ex-
post analysis of changes in poverty if we have household surveys for at least two 
periods. This section presents a methodology to estimate the PEGR by utilising unit 
record data available for any two periods. 
The general class of poverty measure θ given in (2) is fully characterised by 
the poverty line z, the mean income µ, and the Lorenz curve L(p). That is:  
θ = θ (z, µ, L(p)) Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  429
Suppose the income distributions in the initial and terminal years have   
mean incomes µ1 and µ2 with the Lorenz curves L1(p) and L2(p), respectively.   
An estimate of total poverty elasticity can be estimated by 
δ ˆ  = (Ln [θ (z, µ2 , L2(p)] – Ln[θ (z, µ1 , L1(p)])/γ ˆ    
where γ ˆ   is given by 
γ ˆ  = Ln (µ2) – Ln (µ1) 
which is an estimate of growth rate of mean income. 
An estimate of PEGR is given by 
* ˆ γ  = ( ) ˆ / ˆ η δγ ˆ   … … … … … … (17) 
where η ˆ  is an estimate of the growth elasticity of poverty, which should satisfy 
Equation (11):  
ζ + η = δ ˆ ˆ ˆ   ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (18)   
where  ζ ˆ  is an estimate of the inequality effect of poverty reduction. Kakwani’s 
(2000) poverty decomposition methodology can then be used to calculate η ˆ  and ζ ˆ  
by the following formulae: 
η ˆ  =  () () () () [] ) ( , , ( ) ( , , ( ) ( , , ( ) ( , , (
2
1
2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 p L z ln p L z ln p L z ln p L z ln µ θ − µ θ + µ θ − µ θ / γ ˆ   
and 
ζ ˆ = () () () () [] ) ( , , ( ) ( , , ( ) ( , , ( ) ( , , (
2
1
1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 p L z ln p L z ln p L z ln p L z ln µ θ − µ θ + µ θ − µ θ /γ ˆ  
which will always satisfy Equation (18).
13 This methodology can be used to estimate 
the PEGR for the entire class of poverty measures given in (2).   
The proportional reduction in poverty is equal to δ ˆ γ ˆ , which is equal to η ˆ * ˆ γ  
from (19). Since η ˆ  is always negative (unless  1 µ =  2 µ ), the magnitude of poverty 
reduction will be a monotonically increasing function of  * ˆ γ ; the larger the  * ˆ γ , the 
 
13Kakwani (2000) justified this decomposition using an axiomatic approach. Kraay (2003) 
estimated the growth and inequality effects using Datt and Ravallion’s (1992) poverty decomposition, 
which consists of three components, namely, growth component, inequality component and a residual 
term. He calls this decomposition as the discrete-time analog of (11). Equation (11) consists of only 
growth and inequality components. So estimating (11) using a discrete a discrete-time analog with three 
components will give inconsistent estimates of growth and inequality components.  Kakwani and Son  430
greater the percentage reduction in poverty between the two periods. Thus, maximising 
* ˆ γ  will be equivalent to maximising the percentage reduction in poverty.
14 
 
6.  DATA SOURCES AND CONCEPTS USED 
The data for Korea comes from the country’s household survey, which is 
called the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) and is conducted every 
year by the National Statistical Office in Korea. These household surveys are unit-
recorded data, and are used for this study covering the period from 1990 to 1999. 
They include income and consumption components for more than 20,000 households 
in urban areas. We utilised the Minimum Cost of Living (MCL) basket developed in 
1994 by the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) as the poverty 
line. We modified this poverty line by taking into account different costs of living 
between Seoul and other cities. The poverty line has been updated for other years by 
using the separate consumer price indices for Seoul and other cities. 
It must be emphasised that we have used a Korea-specific poverty line, which 
measures the minimum acceptable standard of living in Korea. Therefore, the 
incidence of poverty computed here cannot be compared with the incidence of 
poverty in other countries. Our main objective here is to analyse changes in poverty 
and how it has been affected by the economic growth in Korea. 
The data source for Thailand comes from the Socio-Economic Surveys (SES) 
covering the period from 1988 to 1998. These SES data are unit record household 
surveys conducted every two years by the National Statistical Office in Thailand. 
The survey is nation-wide and covers all private, non-institutional households 
residing permanently in municipals, sanitary districts, and villages. However, it 
excludes parts of the population living in transient hotels or rooming houses, 
boarding schools, military barracks, temples, hospitals, prisons, and other such 
institutions. The SES contains information on more than 17,000 households on 
average between 1988 and 1998. 
In estimating poverty, this paper uses the official poverty line developed for 
Thailand, which takes into account spatial price indices as well as individual needs 
that differ depending on household size and its composition.     
For the Vietnam case, the Vietnamese Living Standard Surveys (VLSS) are 
utilised covering the period 1992-93–1997-98. While the 1992-93 VLSS included 
4,800 households, 5,999 households were interviewed in the 1997-98 VLSS.   
These comprise the Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), which provide 
information on total expenditure of each household included in the survey.   
The poverty lines used for this study are 1,160.842 and 1,793.903 thousand dong per 
capita per annum in 1992-93 and 1997-98, respectively. 
 
14Our estimator of PEGR satisfies the monotonicity requirement but in the Appendix we show 
that the pro-poor growth rate proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003) violates the monotonicity axiom. Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  431
We use per capita welfare consumption expenditure as a welfare measure in 
estimating poverty in Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Per capita welfare consumption 
expenditure is expressed as the ratio of per capita total consumption expenditure to 
the per capita poverty line (expressed in percentage). 
 
7.  THREE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
As presented in Table 1, the poverty equivalent growth rates are overall higher 
than the actual growth rates in Korea during the 1990s. This is particularly so before 
the crisis. For example, the PEGR was 9 percent in 1996-97, whereas the annual 
growth rate was actually only 1.8 percent in that same period. What does this imply? 
It suggests that before the crisis, the poor benefited proportionally much more than 
the non-poor, as was reflected in a dramatic reduction in poverty; the head-count 
ratio in Korea decreased from 39.6 percent in 1990 to 8.6 percent in 1997 [Kakwani 
and Son (2000)]. This rapid reduction in poverty during the 1990-97 period was 
achieved due to two factors. One factor was a high economic growth rate of about 7-
8 percent per annum that had prevailed in the economy. The other factor was a 
steady decline in inequality,
15 which facilitated a rapid reduction in poverty in 
addition to the positive growth rates.   
After the onset of the financial crisis, actual growth rates became higher than 
the PEGRs between 1997 and 1999. This indicates that the crisis had adverse 
impacts on the poor rather than on the non-poor. This result is to be expected as poor 
people are more vulnerable to such unexpected economic shocks. This, in turn, calls 
for a permanent system of social safety net, which can protect vulnerable groups of 
people in society from economic downturns.  
 
Table 1 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rates for Korea 










1990-91 9.6  10.7  10.4  10.0 
1991-92 4.0  4.1  3.7  3.6 
1992-93 4.8  5.8  6.6  6.8 
1993-94 7.3  7.2  7.3  7.5 
1994-95 8.2  9.7  9.5  8.9 
1995-96 5.8  5.1  5.0  4.6 
1996-97 1.8  9.0  8.3  9.6 
1997-98 –7.6  –9.0  –10.0  –10.9 
1998-99 9.8  9.6  10.5  11.5 
 
15The Gini index steadily declined from 29 percent in 1990 to 27.9 percent in 1997 [Son (2002)]. Kakwani and Son  432
Note that there has been a sign of recovery in the economy in 1998-99; the 
head-count ratio declined from 19 percent in 1998 to 13.4 percent in 1999 [Kakwani 
(2000)]. Despite this positive sign, our result suggests that the growth process is not 
classifiable as pro-poor. The benefits generated from the positive growth during 
1998-99 did flow proportionally to the non-poor more than to the poor. More 
interestingly, our result points out that compared to the non-poor, the poor overall 
benefited less from the recovery process; among the poor people the ultra-poor 
received proportionally more benefits. This could have happened because of the 
Korean government’s prompt response to the crisis through social welfare programs. 
In response to the financial crisis, the government introduced many social welfare 
programmes—including public works programmes and temporary livelihood 
protection. Public works programmes were particularly effective in helping the ultra-
poor, who were largely unemployed and laid-off within the labour market during the 
economic downturn. Similarly, temporary livelihood protection (which was 
implemented based on an income means test) was also more helpful to the ultra-
poor. 
What has been Thailand’s growth experience in the 1990s? During 1988-92, 
growth was not classified as pro-poor. In spite of an almost 10 percent annual rate of 
economic growth for that period, the growth process did not proportionally benefit 
the poor more than the non-poor. This occurred because the adverse impacts of the 
increase in inequality in that period had counteracted and in fact outweighed the 
favourable impacts expected from the economic growth.
16  
In particular, the proportional benefit flowing to the ultra-poor in 1990-92 was 
much less than that flowing to the poor: in Table 2, the magnitude of PEGRs 
becomes smaller because the poverty measure is more sensitive to the well-being of 
the poorest person. 
 
Table 2 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rates for Thailand 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate 








Severity of  
Poverty Ratio 
1988–90 9.06  5.5  5.9  6.1 
1990–92 7.49  4.3  3.4  3.0 
1992–94 7.65  8.8  8.7  8.8 
1994–96 5.75  7.4  7.2  7.2 
1996–98 –1.00  –2.7  –2.5  –2.5 
1998–00 –0.85  –2.3  –3.8  –4.4 
1988–2000 4.68  3.6  3.3  3.1 
 
16While the Gini index of income increased from 45.1 percent in 1988 to 49.9 percent in 1992, the Gini 
index of consumption increased from 40.3 percent in 1988 to 41 percent in 1992 [Kakwani and Son (2000)]. Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  433
The trend was reversed during 1992-96, when the PEGRs were higher than 
the actual growth rates. Thus, growth is defined as pro-poor between 1992 and 1996 
in that it benefited the poor proportionally more than the non-poor. The pro-poor 
growth resulted from the positive effects of both high growth rates and inequality 
decline over the period.
17      
During 1996-2000, the Thai economy was influenced by the financial crisis.  
As expected, its economic and social impacts were extremely detrimental: while the 
growth in per capita welfare declined by an annual rate of almost 1 percent, poverty 
increased sharply from 11.4 percent in 1996 to 16.2 percent in 2000. As shown in 
Table 2, the adverse impacts of the crisis were prevalent throughout the period and 
were deepened among the ultra-poor in 1998-2000. Unlike Korea, there were no 
prompt responses to the crisis from the Thai government to protect the ultra-poor and 
the vulnerable from the economic shock. 
Although the Thai government has provided little by way of programmes 
constituting social safety nets, the financial crisis has clearly enabled the government 
to learn how existing social systems function under duress. The crisis has revealed 
that considerable effort needs to be directed to the setting up, or further development, 
of social safety nets in the country. This is especially so because traditional family 
systems of support—though resilient during the early part of the crisis—are likely to 
weaken over time, given continuous socioeconomic change and urbanisation, and the 
further demands placed on them. Household coping mechanisms and the informal 
safety nets provided through traditional family systems have their limitations during 
such a crisis.  
Table 3 presents the empirical results for Vietnam. It shows that during 
the 1992-97 period, the PEGRs were consistently higher than the annual growth 
rates of per capita expenditure (5.02 percent for Vietnam as a whole). This 
indicates that the growth process in the country was pro-poor in a way that 
benefited the poor proportionally more than the non-poor. The PEGR for the 
severity of poverty index is greater than those for the poverty gap ratio and the 
poverty incidence.  
This implies that during 1992-97, growth in Vietnam had more beneficial 
impact on the ultra-poor. Similarly, both urban and rural sectors have experienced 
pro-poor growth. This occurred because while both sectors enjoyed high growth 
rates, both also showed a decline in inequality, as estimated by the Gini index of 
per capita expenditure. The Gini index for urban areas fell from 35.07 percent in 
1992-93 to 34.17 percent in 1997-98, whereas for rural areas it declined to 26.42 
per cent in 1997-98 from 28.86 percent in 1992-93 [Son (2003)].  
 
17The Gini index declined from 41 and 39.2 percent in 1992 and 1996, respectively [Kakwani and Son 
(2000)]. Kakwani and Son  434
Table 3 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rates for Vietnam: 1992-93—1997-98 
Measures Total  Urban  Rural 
Actual Growth Rate  5.02  5.28  4.04 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rates for   
Headcount Ratio  5.08  6.28  4.61 
Poverty gap Ratio  5.33  6.46  5.04 
Severity of Poverty  5.43  6.59  5.19 
Watts Index  5.39  6.49  5.13 
 
Vietnam has emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia over 
the last two decades. More importantly, our results have presented that its growth 
process undertaken during 1992-93—1997-98 has been pro-poor, thus benefiting the 
poor proportionally more than the non-poor. This has been attributed to a series of 
reforms, known as doi moi, which were launched in the latter part of the 1980s. 
Reforms began primarily in the agricultural sector which, at the time, accounted for 
close to 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of total employment.  
The country’s reform effort focused initially on the dismantling of collective 
farms, the redistribution of land to peasant households through long-term leases, and 
an abolition of price controls on goods and services. It then eliminated production 
and consumption subsidies and streamlined the public sector [Dollar and Litvack 
(1998); Weinns (1998)]. Furthermore, the reform effort included the stabilisation of 
inflation and the liberalisation of foreign trade and investment [Dollar (2002)].   
This series of reforms paved the way for the country’s spectacular growth in the 
1990s, which in turn contributed to a remarkable poverty reduction.         
 
8.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has proposed a measure of pro-poor growth denominated ‘poverty 
equivalent growth rate’. The poverty equivalent growth rate has been derived for an 
entire class of additively decomposable poverty measures—including the FGT and 
Watts measures. This measure takes into account not only the magnitude of growth, 
but also the manner in which the benefits of growth are distributed to the poor and 
the non-poor. It has been argued in the paper that this new measure satisfies the 
monotonicity axiom, which sets out a condition that the proportional reduction in 
poverty is a monotonically increasing function of the poverty equivalent growth rate. 
As the poverty equivalent growth rate meets the monotonicity criterion, it can be said 
that in order to achieve a rapid reduction in poverty, the poverty equivalent growth 
rate should be maximised rather than the actual growth rate.  
The poverty equivalent growth rate takes a strict approach to defining pro-
poor growth in a way that takes into account either improvement or reduction in Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  435
inequality, as well as in poverty, during growth spells. What is more, the poverty 
equivalent growth rate is further classified into relative and absolute approaches. 
Its relative and absolute measures are formally derived in this paper. The relative 
concept arises when growth benefits the poor proportionally more than the non-
poor, causing relative inequality to fall. In this scenario, the income of the poor 
may increase at a faster rate than that of the non-poor, but their absolute income 
gains will still be smaller. In contrast, the absolute concept occurs when the 
absolute benefits of growth received by the poor are more than or equal to the 
absolute benefits received by the non-poor. Under this definition, absolute 
inequality would be expected to fall during the course of growth. In fact, the 
absolute approach lays out the strongest requirement for pro-poor growth and has 
thus been termed ‘super pro-poor’.      
The methodology developed in this paper has been applied to a few Asian 
countries, including Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. By and large, while Korea and 
Vietnam have experienced a pro-poor growth pattern in the 1990s, Thailand has on 
the whole  not been pro-poor. Two other important policy implications emerge 
from the empirical analysis. Firstly, the financial crisis experienced by both Korea 
and Thailand at the end of the 1990s has revealed that considerable effort needs to 
be directed to the setting up, or further development, of social safety nets in these 
countries. Although the Korean government’s response to the crisis included the 
prompt introduction of various social welfare programmes, the crisis demonstrated 
a call for social safety nets to be enacted on a permanent basis. During the crisis it 
was realised that household-coping mechanisms and traditional family systems of 
support cannot insulate people from such substantial economic shocks. Secondly, 
as the Vietnam experience presents, a ‘growth with redistribution’ strategy has 
played a significant role in achieving impressive growth and poverty outcomes. 
Redistribution policies, such as land reforms, may be necessary to set up the 
economic and political conditions necessary to ensure that subsequent economic 
growth is not highly unequalising [Adelman (1975)]. This has also proved to be 
the case for some countries—including Korea and Taiwan—in their early stages of 
economic development.      
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APPENDICES 
 
In this Appendix, we demonstrate theoretically as well as empirically with the 
help of a hypothetical example, that Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) estimate of pro-
poor growth will violate their basic Axiom 1: 
Axiom 1: The measure should be consistent with the direction of change in 
poverty, in that a positive (negative) rate of pro-poor growth implies a reduction 
(increase) in poverty. 
The violation of this axiom will imply that the magnitude of poverty reduction 
will not necessarily be a decreasing function of the pro-poor growth. 
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Thus, Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) estimate of pro-poor index will violate 
Axiom 1, which implies that the magnitude of poverty reduction will not necessarily 
be a decreasing function of the pro-poor index.  Pro-poor Growth: Concepts and Measurement  437
Table A.1 presents a hypothetical example giving welfare levels of 20 
persons. The poverty line is 100. It can be seen that the percentage of poor has 
decreased from 50 percent to 35 percent but the Watts measure has increased from 
20.3 to 22.8. The Ravallion and Chen’s index of pro-poor growth is computed to be 
11.3 percent, which means that Ravallion and Chen’s index violates their basic 
Axiom 1.  
This also implies that maximisation of Ravallion and Chen’s index does not 
necessarily lead to the maximisation of poverty reduction. This monotonicity 
property is always satisfied by our pro-poor growth measure. 
 
Table A.1 
A Hypothetical Example 
Welfare in  Percentage of Poor Watts Measure  Number of 





1    25    30   100   100  138.6  120.4  20.0  20.0 
2    58    40   100   100  54.5  91.6  –31.0  –31.0 
3    60    40   100   100  51.1  91.6  –33.3  –33.3 
4    65    50   100   100  43.1  69.3  –23.1  –23.1 
5    70    80   100   100  35.7  22.3  14.3  14.3 
6   75    100    100    0  28.8  0.0  33.3  33.3 
7   80    120    100    0  22.3  0.0  50.0  50.0 
8    85    90   100   100  16.3  10.5  5.9  5.9 
9    90    60   100   100  10.5  51.1  –33.3  –33.3 
10   95    200    100    0  5.1  0.0  110.5  110.5 
11    100    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  20.0  0.0 
12    105    150   0   0  0.0  0.0  42.9  0.0 
13    110    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  9.1  0.0 
14    115    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  4.3  0.0 
15    120    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
16    125    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  –4.0  0.0 
17    130    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  –7.7  0.0 
18    135    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  –11.1  0.0 
19    140    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  –14.3  0.0 
20    145    120   0   0  0.0  0.0  –17.2  0.0 
Average  96.4   102    50    35  20.3  22.8  5.8  11.3 
Note: R-C  pro-poor index: Ravallion and Chen pro-poor index. 
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The interrelationship between economic growth, inequality and poverty has 
been debated extensively on both theoretical and empirical levels. The authors 
develop on index of pro-poor growth called poverty-equivalent growth rate which 
takes account of both the magnitude of growth and the benefits that flow to poor 
from growth. The authors make a case for maximising the poverty equivalent growth 
rate than in growth rate alone for rapid reduction in poverty.  This new concept is 
applied to Korea and Thailand. The renewed focus on poverty reduction requires a 
yard stick that can be used to evaluate the policies aimed at poverty alleviation. The 
authors’ proposed index provides this yard stick. 
While appreciating the effort, we would like to point out that the stumbling 
block in using the proposed recipe maximising the poverty-equivalent growth rate 
may lie in the lack of consensus on the appropriate elements of policy and 
development strategies in the policy circles that maximise the adjusted growth rate. 
There may be additional problems of definitions and measurements in the case of 
poverty as well as the growth rate. Review of these issues by the authors could have 
provided a context and a perspective in which their main recommendation needs to 
be placed. The following remarks are intended to complement the contributions   
made by authors. 
The finding that Korean economic growth has been more pro-poor relative to 
growth in Thailand is interesting. It would have been more useful to the policy-
makers in developing countries if analytical information was also provided for both 
countries on their respective patterns of growth and the complex set of interaction 
among policies, institutions and socio-economic processes having a bearing on the 
benefits accruing to the poor.  The contrasting policy and institutional choices made 
by Korea and Thailand would have thrown light on the possible instruments that 
developing countries could use to maximise the poverty-equivalent growth rate. Role 
of growth strategies like outward-oriented trade and industrial development, 
agricultural-led growth and redistributive reforms in promoting growth and poverty 
reduction at different stages of growth are some of the areas that need to be 
addressed for drawing policy lessons. 
Some recent empirical evidence strongly suggests that the rate of poverty 
reduction from growth depends on initial inequalities in land, human capital and 
other assets. The comparison of poverty-equivalent growth rate for different 
countries would need to come to terms with the importance of initial conditions in 
determining the growth path of poverty. Sarfraz K. Qureshi  442
There is also a need to look carefully at the quality of data used for estimating  
both growth rate and different indicators of poverty.  This is especially important if 
the aim is to compare the development performance between different countries. 
Researchers may reach different conclusions conditions about how “pro-poor” 
growth is simply from use of different definitions of poverty line and data of varying 
quality. 
The authors allude to an important issue of the need for instituting a effective 
system of social safety nets to take care of some groups who will all always be left 
behind no matter how pro-poor the growth may be.  These people include the 
elderly, sick and disabled persons. The bust phenomena experienced in the wake of 
Asian crisis has highlighted the need for formal social safety nets. It is important, 
however, to ensure that such social safety nets be designed to be flexible in the sense 
that these can be expanded and/or contracted according to the scale of the misery 
experienced from the crisis. 
In conclusion, the authors need to be commended on the exposition of a new 
concept in the literature on poverty-growth interrelationship. The use of the proposed 
index for different countries would ultimately test its usefulness and limitations. 
There is, however, a need to extend the analytical effort of the authors by a further 
analysis of the behaviour of poverty-equivalent growth rate by country types or 
policy regimes or alternative development strategies. 
 
Sarfraz K. Qureshi  







It is a privilege for me to be a discussant on this paper written by the eminent 
scholars Prof. N. Kakwani and H. H. Son. Prof. Kakwani has written extensively on 
poverty and growth; his interest in this field goes back to 1980s when he wrote a 
book on Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimating and Policy 
Application. Today, he has presented an excellent paper on Concepts and 
Measurement of Pro-poor Growth. Although the paper has not directly addressed 
Pakistan, it is timely for us because the concept of pro-poor growth has become focal 
point in the thinking of donors as well policy-makers in their efforts for poverty 
reduction. The proposed method for measuring the pro-poor growth would be an 
effective and useful tool to examine the poverty-growth nexus in Pakistan. 
The paper has four parts; first it classifies the concept of pro-poor growth, 
followed by the detail of Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) method to 
measure pro-poor growth. It then shows how to calculate the PEGR. Finally the 
paper gives results about two South East Asian countries: Korea and Thailand. The 
data for Korea came from its household surveys conducted every year, 1990–99. The 
paper utilised the Korea specific poverty line. The data sources for Thailand came 
from the socio-economic surveys for the 1990–1999 period, conducted biannually. 
The paper has used the official poverty line for Thailand. Per capita welfare 
consumption is used as welfare measure in estimating poverty in Korea and 
Thailand. Per capita welfare consumption is expressed as the ratio of per capita total 
consumption to per capita poverty line. The paper concluded that on the whole, both 
Korea and Thailand had high economic growth in the 1990s, before the crisis. 
Nevertheless the Korean economic growth generated proportionally more benefits to 
the poor than the non-poor, whereas the Thai economic growth benefits the non-poor 
proportionately. 
Paper has rightly demonstrated that poverty elasticity, which determines the 
extent of poverty reduction, is highly sensitive to the country’s initial levels of 
economic development and income equality. PEGR is the weighted average of the 
growth rates of incomes at each percentile point with the weight depending on the 
poverty measure used. So PEGR can be computed for any poverty measures, e.g. 
FGT class of poverty measures or Watt poverty measure. Prof. Kakwani and Son 
provide a general methodology encompassing all the additive separable poverty 
measures. For the benefit of readers, the paper has outlined how can one calculates 
PEGR if one has household survey data for at least two periods. However, poverty is G. M. Arif  444
multi-dimensional. It is affected by educational attainments, health, food security, 
female participation in labour and employment. How these concepts can be 
incorporated in the PEGR? Moreover, the PEGR depend on the choice of poverty 
line and the quality of household survey data. However these two factors can affect 
the PEGR? 
The relationship between economic growth and poverty has been studied 
extensively. More recently the cross-country regression analyses have been carried 
out to study this phenomenon. Findings of these studies are in general consistent 
with the trickle down theory, suggesting that some fraction of total benefits of 
economic growth will always trickle down to the poor. Prof. Kakwani and Son, 
however, have argued that the conclusions of these studies can only depict the 
average picture of cross-country experiences. Individual country experience on the 
relationship between growth and poverty cannot be captured using this cross-country 
regression methodology. Few studies have also shown that the findings from 
household-level analysis may differ from those of the cross-country literature. 
Kakwani and Son have rightly argued that the trickle-down development indeed 
reduces poverty but the rate of reduction may be much slow. It is the slowness of 
poverty reduction that has generated so much interest in the ideas of pro-poor 
growth. Thus besides the growth rate, structure of the growth is very important in 
poverty reduction efforts. Pro-poor growth calls for enhancing growth that goes 
beyond the idea of trickle-down. 
The real question for Pakistan is how to make growth pro-poor? The low the 
initial level of income and the higher the initial degree of inequality, the harder it 
will be for growth to lift people out of poverty. The ideal strategy would be to boost 
growth, reduce inequality and significantly reduce poverty. If there is a rapid 
reduction in poverty accompanied by faster growth, some rise in relative income 
inequality may not be a major concern. Economic growth in Pakistan has been high 
for the more recent period. There are also some signs of poverty reduction. The 
preferred option for Pakistan would be a pattern of high sustained growth for poverty 
reduction, combined with as little or no increase in inequality as policy and reforms 
can produce. This will require policies for broad-based human capital formation to 
ensure that the workforce has the appropriate skills to take advantage of economic 
growth. At the same time, it will also be important to pursue specific anti-poverty 
programmes and ensure stronger systems of social protection. This will benefit the 
poor in the short term as well as prepare the ground for take-off towards faster 
poverty reduction. 
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